pride versus self-respect by Morton, Adam
1pride versus self-respect
DRAFT, though a late draft. To appear in  Adam Carter & Emma Gordon, eds.
The Moral Psychology of Pride
"Then for the first time, we became aware that our language lacks words to
express this offence, the demolition of a man."   
Primo Levi, If this is a Man
I breathe the fragrance myself and know it and like it,
The distillation would intoxicate me also, but I shall not let it.  
Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass
This is not an essay that analyses our normal concepts. Nor really one that
suggests the natural facts that underlie our normal thinking. Instead, it is an
essay about gaps, confusions, and explanatory failures in our usual ways of
thinking. My claim is that there is something deeply wrong about the way we
think about feelings of pride and their connection with the attitudes a person
has toward herself and others. “We” means roughly and generally consumers
of  the  philosophy  we  take  seriously  even  if  we  don’t  buy  much  of  it,
participants in the societies that influence and are influenced by it, and more
specifically me until I began working on this essay. (And I suspect the error
extends to a large proportion of humanity. But I don’t know enough for any
confidence on this.) We miss something essential about human nature and
the  possibilities  for  a  satisfactory  life  by  ignoring  a  central  form of  self-
respect. This kind of self-respect has some abstract features in common with
pride and other emotions of self-evaluation, but its differences from them are
2important and easily obscured by the comparison. One consequence is that
we deprive ourselves of resources for describing some ways in which life can
be deeply wounding.
pride, arrogance, approval
Start with Aristotle. His account of  megalopsychia, in the general family of
pride,  contrasts  both  with  the  kind  of  self-respect  I  shall  elicit  and  with
features of  pride as  we now usually  think of  it.  He holds  up a model  of
virtuous pride which consists in knowing how admirable one is. For Aristotle
there  is  nothing  wrong  with  letting  everyone  know that  one  knows  how
admirable one is, as long as one really is that fine. As he says:
The proud man, then, is an extreme in respect of the greatness of his
claims, but a mean in respect of the rightness of them; for he claims
what is accordance with his merits, while the others go to excess or
fall short. (Nicomachean Ethics, book 4 ch 3)
There is a cultural divide between Aristotle and most people who are likely to
read this, perhaps because we grew up in a moral atmosphere influenced by
the legacy of Christianity, which makes us uncomfortable with the depicted
manner of his great-souled person, but it is relatively superficial as long as
we think that pride does have an essential connection with the self attribution
of virtues.  Perhaps there is  a virtue that Aristotle does not appreciate  of
being tactful about one's knowledge of one's virtues. And "pride" may miss
3something as a translation of megalopsuchia. But the fact remains that there
is  a  quality  that  Aristotle  admires  that  involves  an  honest  and  explicit
appreciation of what is noble about one.
Hume's  account  of  pride  is  not  really that  different.  In  Davidson's
modernizing words, Hume can be summarized as
...  maintaining that, if someone is proud that he exemplifies a certain
property, then he approves of, or thinks well of, others for exemplifying
the  same  property.  This  approval  is  not  to  be  distinguished  from
holding  that  anyone  who  has  the  property  is  to  that  extent
praiseworthy, estimable, or virtuous.  (Davidson 1973 p. 748, see also
Ardal 1989, Baier 1978.)  
Hume sums up a central point by saying “a hearty pride, or self-esteem, if
well-concealed and well-founded,” is a natural virtue (Hume 1739/1888 book
3, part 2, section 2.11; for clear and authoritative historical context, shaming
my  amateur  version  see  Schmitter  2014.)  Note  the  emphasis  on
concealment, which contrasts with Aristotle, but also the “hearty” and “well-
founded”, which tend in Aristotle’s general direction. Pride taken as a virtue,
distinct from arrogance or grandiosity, is shown when following Hume we tell
someone we are proud of  them. (Or when we speak of  gay pride,  black
pride: the aim is really self-respect,  only partly because it  is a means to
respect from others. Perhaps we say “pride” rather than “self-respect” here
because we don't want to seem to mince words. Or perhaps pride is what
4people need in order to get a lever on their self-respect. See below.)
So you are proud in a virtuous way if  you know you are good but keep
relatively quiet about it. Your private awareness of your quality might then be
labelled as self-respect.  This is  just one thing we can refer to with “self-
respect”, though, and one I shall de-emphasise. I thus prefer Hume’s label of
self-esteem for what he is describing, with its direct contrast with conceit or
arrogance, which are partly a matter of tactless candour about a person's
attitude to herself,  and partly a sign of comparing others unfavourably to
herself.  This terminology is continued in more recent discussions of pride,
such as Taylor’s careful discussion in chapter III of Taylor (1985). (See also
her  discussion  of  self-respect  and  self-esteem  in  chapter  V,  which  as  a
product of the philosophy of its time is meant as a tidy version of what we
normally mean.) 
So summing up this conventional view shared with different emphases by a
number of philosophers –- to Aristotle, Hume, and Taylor, already cited, we
could add for example Isenberg (1949) -- we get delicately opposed virtues
and vices which can hide behind the labels of pride and humility.
5Virtues Vices
self-respect/esteem abasement
knowledge of one's capacities overestimation of one’s capacities
appreciation of the value of others ignorance of the value of others
humility of manner denigration of others
It may often be unclear whether someone is exhibiting one of these virtues
or the corresponding vice, for example whether someone is  being honest
about the benefits she can bring to a shared project or exaggerating her
capacities for the sake of her own status or advantage. And it is routinely
unclear whether a particular ascription of pride or humility alludes to the left
column or the right column. Moreover, even when in speaking of pride we are
clearly  praising  or  condemning,  it  is  usually  pretty  ambiguous  what  the
relative weighting of the component virtues or vices is. That is just to say
that these are quite subtle concepts and our speech and our thoughts about
ourselves and others are usually rough and hasty.
They are subtle concepts because they are concerned with striking a delicate
balance.  On  the  one  hand  it  is  a  good  thing  if  people  understand  their
capacities and their limits, and motivate themselves both to develop their
capacities and to act where their contribution is most valuable. On the other
hand it is a bad thing if people overestimate what they can do, and if they
present themselves in ways that restrict the possibilities of others. Seen this
way it  makes sense  that  these  virtues,  like  many others,  hover  between
6feeling and manner. Their effects are found both in a person's attitude to
herself and others and in her social behaviour.
Pride, thus understood, can be made intelligible by attributing any quality
that one values to anything one is connected with. Indeed, as Hume points
out, the valued quality can be pretty tenuously connected to oneself. Though
tone deaf oneself, one can be proud that one's granddaughter is an excellent
violinist. It is just the fact that she is one's own granddaughter that allows
pride. (I am following Davidson in rephrasing Hume's view in terms of being
proud  that  something  is  the  case  rather  than  proud  of  an  object,  thus
separating the fact of which one is proud from the connection with oneself.)
But we can tighten the interpretation towards a specifically moral version by
requiring that the quality in question is a generally accepted moral value and
the connection with oneself is simply that one instantiates the quality. Then
we have a version of self-respect. (It is not the only version. Another will be
more important.) It is the realization that one is capable of doing good and
often lives up to one's moral aspirations. Self-respect — if understood in this
way — is to respect for others as pride is to admiration. And just as pride can
take the pathological form of arrogance self-respect can take the pathological
form of smugness. This special and probably not very idiomatic self-respect
would then be a mild and moralized version of pride.
To sum this up, suppose we could have the conceptual and emotional agility
7to assess what is useful and admirable about ourselves accurately, avoiding
unnecessary  display  of  the  assessment  beyond  what  is  needed  to  make
shared projects go well,  and avoiding unjustified or pointless comparisons
between ourselves and others. Then we would often be proud in a self-and
other-respecting  way.  No  arrogance,  no  false  humility,  no  invidious
comparisons, just accurate thinking and a satisfaction that would flow from
it. If only.
But  even  if  these  acrobatics  were  easy,  there  would  still  be  something
missing, something vital.  In the remainder of this paper I try to be clear
about what it is.
shame and guilt versus regret
Pride  is  often  discussed in  conjunction  with  retrospective  moral  emotions
such as regret, remorse, shame, or for that matter embarrassment. (Taylor
1985 chapters 2, 3; Morton 2013 part 4.) These emotions are often labelled
as retrospective because their central examples usually concern a person’s
reflecting on her past actions, but they can also apply to present and even to
anticipated actions: this is particularly so for shame and embarrassment. And
indeed  pride,  regret,  remorse,  and  shame have  a  number  of  features  in
common. For present purposes it is the contrasts between shame and guilt
on the one hand and regret on the other hand that are most informative. One
8contrast  concerns  the  objects  of  these  emotions.  One  regrets  doing  a
particular act or series of acts or that a particular event occurred. Less so for
guilt. It can also be directed at a pattern of behaviour over a period of time.
Even less so for shame. One can be ashamed that one was a certain way, for
example prejudiced or self-centred, in a large part of one's life. (Shame can
be occasioned by and directed at a particular action, but the shame is that
one was a person who could do it.) There is also a contrast between the
points of view intrinsic to these different emotions. With regret, one typically
looks back oneself on the past and wishes that it had not been so or that
some alternative had been available. With guilt one brings to mind some real
or imaginary authority figure – God, parents, the law, bearing in mind that
these may be imagined in order to gain an external attitude to oneself – and
one brings to mind the disapproval they would have if they knew what you
were up to. (The assumed judgment doesn't have to be towards the past:
one can feel guilty while transgressing.) With shame and embarrassment one
also brings to mind a possible or actual point of view, but it is more literal.
The  person  condemning  or  even  just  laughing  at  you  is  real  or  easily
available,  and  if  you  can  block  their  finding  out  the  emotion  is  at  least
diminished. (For a discussion of this with evidence see chapter 2 of Deonna,
Rodogno,  and  Teroni  2011.)  These  two  contrasts  are  loosely  connected,
because  an  imaginary  point  of  view  on  one's  actions  can  take  a  more
comprehensive  perspective,  even  bringing  together  things  that  no  real
human judgment would unite. But the connection is loose, and partly as a
9result there is a lot of room for variation in the retrospective emotions easily
available in different cultures. (This is a theme of Morton 2011, where I use
the device of imagined points of  view to structure the variety of  possible
retrospective  emotions  and  to  summarise  the  distinctions  between  them
made by such writers as Williams and Taylor.)
Pride is on the regret side of this divide and self-respect on the guilt/remorse
side.  Pride  is  about  something  specific,  a  capacity  or  accomplishment  or
other  source  of  status  that  one values.  Self-respect  is  less  specific.  It  is
directed at general features of one's worth, much as shame can be. And it
adopts an external point of view which may not be that of any actual person,
much as guilt can. To turn the emotion into a thought it is not so much "I
approve of this about me" as "an objective point of view would approve of
this about me" or "I am approvable in this respect". This is not to say that
self-respect  and  lack  of  self-respect  cannot  be  triggered  by  particular
attitudes of  particular  people  to  particular  qualities  and acts.  Notoriously,
praise or criticism by someone one trusts, admires, or is close to, particularly
by a parent to a child, can have deep and often lasting effects on a person's
general sense of her worth and capacities. (Fair and kindly presented specific
criticism is good, all-purpose undermining even when fair and often when
meant kindly is bad: the problem is keeping them apart.) 
Ascriptions of moods and states of character interact in a complicated way
with these distinctions about occurrent emotions. A person can be prone to
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regret  or  be  in  a  regretful  mood,  and  then  she  is  likely  to  regret  many
specific and unrelated actions and facts. (That is what a regretful mood is: a
mood in which the person is inclined to emotions of regret.) But it is not
because there is a single very general or very consequential thing that is
regretted but because the person’s character or mood makes her do a lot of
regretting. Similarly, someone may be proud just as a matter of character,
not proud particularly of this or that but inclined to be proud of many things.
And in a proud mood, perhaps brought on by being proud of some particular
accomplishment, she becomes, perhaps temporarily, a proud person. Self-
respect  does not need to be mixed into moods or  states of  character  to
acquire this generality. It already has it, because in contrast to emotions such
pride, regret,  or guilt.  it  is a long term disposition rather than a passing
state. 
Self-respect is a moral  emotion in a rather weak way. At its heart is the
thought that one is objectively acceptable, which I take as imagining some
respected  point  of  view  which  smiles  on  one.  And  this  is  vulnerable  to
awareness that one has done wrong, so that a respected attitude to one
would not be benign. It is very diffuse in that it does not need a focus on any
particular act,  or even any attribute. (Contrast it  to pride in this respect,
especially  along  the  lines  of  Davidson’s  Hume,  where  one  is  proud  that
something in particular is the case.) In fact it is even less definite than this
may suggest,  since self-respect brings  a confidence that future aims and
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activities  are  also  likely  to  be  alright  (acceptable,  approved  of  from  an
external point of view). 
absences and wounds 
We speak of lack of pride and wounded pride almost as often as of pride, and
of lack of self-respect, injured self-respect, and diminished self-respect. The
sense of self-respect which is not a special kind of pride is more accessible in
these negative uses. (Though the terms remain deeply ambiguous. I don’t
think we could use “self-respect”, or that matter “pride”, “regret” and the
others, with a chance of communicating unless by considering what we know
of the person we are describing and employing some empathetic simulation
to  tune  the  words  to  the  particular  case.)  Consider  someone  who  just
generally  feels  bad  about  herself,  pessimistic  about  her  capacities  and
prospects. (In later parts of this paper I discuss things that can precipitate
this.) We are likely to say that she has diminished self-respect, but less likely
to say that her pride is wounded or that she is less proud. The former would
usually suggest a more specific focus, and the latter would usually describe
her manner rather than how she feels and thinks. Indeed it  is  intuitively
plausible, though rather pop-psychological, that her diminished self-respect
may lead to a compensatingly more prideful manner. You need a very strong
self-respect to act humbly among overbearing people.
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Just as there need be no easily discernible cognitive or motivational reason
why someone has a proud character or is in a proud mood, there may be no
easy non-physiological reason why someone's self-respect is low. That's just
the way she is. The injury to self-respect may be temporary or long-term,
minor or catastrophic.
These  are  absences  and  reductions  of  self-respect,  and  they  make  a
particular kind of self-respect salient. Keeping these particular absences and
reductions in mind, we can tease out the more elusive positive concept that
can be hard to separate from a kind of pride. Absence of absence. Suppose
that a person has a blow to her self-respect and then recovers. What she has
recovered is self-respect as she previously had it, of the relevant kind to be
contrasted with pride. She is now more at peace with herself. Suppose that a
person is feeling and functioning in the normal human range and then has a
catastrophic decline in her self-respect. (It has to be catastrophic, because
the normal human range is so wide.) Then what she has lost is self-respect in
the intended sense.
some moral discoveries
Right action consists, we might think, in helping people get what they want,
respecting  their  autonomy,  giving  them  pleasure  rather  than  pain,  and
cooperating with them for mutual benefit. Moral theories in philosophy differ
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in which of these they make central and how they account for the importance
of  the  less  central  ones.  (For  utilitarianism  the  central  concept  is  the
pleasure/pain  balance,  for  contractarianism  cooperation,  and  for  Kantian
ethics autonomy.) But the essence of morality is taken, both in philosophy
and I think in most of our everyday thinking, to lie in these areas. I think
that moral philosophy is missing a basic shift of attitude here. For in recent
decades we have without  putting  the pieces  together  discovered that  we
have overlooked something important. Here are some of the pieces.
Rape, and sexual abuse of children. No one decent has ever thought that
these  were  anything  but  reprehensible.  But  the  grounds for  thinking  this
have shifted. In the time of my childhood, at any rate, these would be seen
primarily as violations of autonomy, breaches of social norms that we would
expect to be respected, and as inflictions of short-term pain and discomfort.
(Susanna Braund  points  out  to  me that  in  Roman culture  the  rape  of  a
daughter or a servant is taken as an offence against the paterfamilias, and in
Greek culture the rape of a woman in the temple of a goddess will usually
lead to the goddess’ anger at the woman for defiling her space rather than at
the rapist. One is reminded of reports of contemporary cultures in which rape
victims are charged with adultery.) But, fairly recently, we have come to see
a basic  thing that is  missing from these reactions.  The victims are often
damaged in a deep and long term way, which is sometimes seen as akin to
post-traumatic stress. They can be prone to depression, irrational feelings of
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guilt,  a  sense  of  being  bad  and  unworthy,  and  in  some  cases  suicidal
tendencies. Sum it up by saying that their self-respect is damaged. (They
may find it difficult to trust and respect others, too, but one factor here may
be that they do not think of themselves as suitable partners in a compact.) 
(A  conjecture:  the  Catholic  Church  never  dreamt  of  anything  but
condemnation  of  abusive  priests.  But  it  took  the  grounds  for  the
condemnation to be forbidden sex rather than terrible wounding. Though this
is a conjecture, some support is given by the papal document Sacramentum
Poenitentiae, which takes the crime to be a violation of the commandment
against adultery. A confession: until I was perhaps thirty I thought that rape
was wrong because it is a violation of autonomy, not because it damages its
victims.)
Similarly we thought of torture as the infliction of great pain, which it usually
is. But in so doing we ignored the great injury to a person's conception of
herself,  of  which  there  is  now  abundant  evidence.  (For  a  philosophical
assessment see Bernstein 2015.) We misconceived traumatic stress along the
same lines (Kashdana 2006).
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These  are  large  dramatic  issues.  But  there  are  more  ordinary  everyday
versions.  We have learned that  corporal  punishment  of  children does not
make  them  become  well-adjusted  and  well-behaved  adults.  (See  the
literature  summary  in  the  “end  corporal  punishment”  site  listed  in  the
bibliography.) They find it harder to transmute their self-respect into respect
for others. A vitally important topic is that of subtle implicit prejudice. There
is  now  a  lot  of  evidence  that  having  one's  attention  drawn  to  one's
membership  in  a  group  thought  to  be  less  capable  reduces  one's
performance  on  tasks  requiring  attention  and  skill  (Steele  and  Aronson
1995). And an explanation, also with evidence behind it, is that there are
cognitive  consequences  of  activating  a  diminished  sense  of  one's  worth
(Schmader 2008.)
The common theme here is that we have misunderstood some kinds of harm,
ways in which people can be damaged. It was not obvious, except perhaps
with considerable hindsight, that these injuries would be as damaging as they
are. It took evidence, and conceptual progress, before we could see what
was right  before  us.  And the  natural  way of  summing up what  we have
learned is that self-respect is a delicate thing and damage to it affects people
more that we had realized. 
It is conceptual speculation, but it is tempting to suggest that there is a deep
and systematic divide between two categories of wrong. On the one hand
there is the frustration of people's desires, the infliction of pain inasmuch as
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that  is  something  that  they  very  much  do  not  want,  and  more  general
violations of social contracts. And on the other hand there is damage to the
way people think about themselves and the resources they can summon to
live  their  lives.  This  can come in  small  as  well  as  dramatic  forms,  as  in
everyday denigration. We might call these two kinds of wrong frustration and
atrocity. Is there a thoroughgoing contrast between them? Would it be moral
progress to distinguish them explicitly? I suspect so, but it would take more
than what I am saying here to make a definite case. (Card 2002, Morton
2004. Card appreciates the point I am now making better than I did then.) 
An ironical note is that the irrationally inflated sense of one's own worth, a
tendency to arrogance, with many exceptions on both sides more common
among men than among women (Bleidorn 2016), is some protection against
letting comment, criticism, or the impact of plain fact, impact on one’s sense
of one’s value. We might say that irrational pride can armour self-respect:
delusion has its uses.
This connects with points Bernard Williams makes about acting with integrity.
In a well-known passage, Williams emphasizes that every person has
projects or attitudes which … he takes seriously at the deepest level,
as what his life is about.  ...  [To think otherwise is to] neglect the
extent to which his projects and his decisions have to be seen as the
actions and decisions which flow from the projects and attitudes with
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which he is most closely identified. It is thus, in the most literal sense,
an attack on his integrity.  (Williams 1973, pp. 116-117.)
Williams thus takes moral agents to have a grasp of what their  lives are
about and what their constitutive projects and attitudes are. He is clearly
thinking of adult and reflective agents, but I am sure he would not insist that
the  grasp  be  conscious  or  articulate.  People  can  also  less  explicitly  and
consciously  grasp  and  endorse  who  they  are,  and  unless  this  is  deeply
embedded in their motivation it is hard to see how the identification could
exert much hold on them. It would seem like superficial role-play. These are
not themselves self-respect but they are provide the materials for it, without
which there is nothing for self-respect to endorse. (See also Taylor 1985,
chapter  5,  which  is  explicit  about  the  link  with  self-respect  and  the
susceptibility to shame and guilt that it generates.)
love, depression
There are other concepts that have some features in common, though I think
the connections are not as tight as one might suppose. One is love. To have a
robust self-respect is like loving oneself, given a suitable version of love. Or
more mildly to take oneself  to be lovable or worthy of love. A distinction
analogous to Darwall's (1977) distinction between recognition respect and
appraisal respect is helpful here. Recognition respect is directed at people
(and other things) inasmuch as they are people and respect is appropriate to
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agents as such. In this it is like the Kantian notion of dignity, which everyone
is owed. It can't be withheld from a person on the basis of their individual
nature. Appraisal respect, on the other hand, is directed at people (and other
things) for particular features and capacities that they possess. One does not
respect the testimony of a liar, though we should try to react in a way that
respects her dignity as a person. Similarly, what we might call recognition
loveability is what is due to a person independently of their particular details,
and  what  we  might  call  appraisal  loveability  depends  on  their  particular
appeal to the person making the attribution. My appraisal loveability in my
own eyes is how fond I am of myself, on the basis of the features that evoke
affection in me, and that is in the family of pride. My recognition loveability in
my own eyes is how much I think I deserve to be loved, on the basis of being
a  human  person.  That  is  in  the  family  of  self-respect.  But  it  is  more
intellectual,  more  a  thought  that  a  feeling.  I  can  acknowledge that  as  a
person with moral status I am in the category of things that can be, indeed
ought to be, loved, and at the same time find my self respect deficient. In a
pattern  we  have  seen  before,  it  may  be  a  feature  of  many  people's
psychology that an injury to their appraisal loveability may set off an injury
to their recognition loveability. But the connection will often not hold, and in
any case they are quite different concepts.
There is another connection between love and self-respect. Love between two
people requires that they have similar or congruent conceptions of what can
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be a basis for valuing another. At any rate if they grasp this in very different
ways that will be a barrier between them. Without it, they can cooperate and
aid  one another to  achieve present  shared aims — tasks  for  friends and
colleagues — but they will  find it  much harder to maintain one another's
capacity for coherent action through changes of desire, since the basis for
self-respect includes future and possible projects as well as present ones. (A
test: can one intuit presents for the other which it would surprise the other to
find that they come to like.)
Another  concept  related  to  self-respect,  with  an  opposite  connection,  is
depression.  Depressed  people  often  have  low  self-respect.  (Psychologists
tend to say low self-esteem. The terms are often used synonymously. But I
would say self-esteem is lacking when someone falls short in some way they
consciously value while self-respect is lacking when they have a sense, which
they may never articulate, that they are not very worthy.) But the connection
is not at all universal. Many depressed people feel well about themselves,
though they despair of their condition (Kernis 2008.) It seems likely to me
that the connection runs in the other direction and is psychological rather
than conceptual: depression will often disable resources that would enable
one  to  maintain  one's  self-respect.  (This  is  controversial,  and  the
psychological  literature  is  fragmented.  There  are  too  many  mysterious
components of both depression and self-respect/self-esteem. For an attempt
at separating some of the strands, which does not deliver an ideal message
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for what I am saying, see Orth and Robins 2013. For a contrasting view see
Baumeister 2005.) 
functioning 
It doesn't have to be morally framed. There is practical functioning, which
cannot proceed without a sense that one's projects, including idiosyncratic
ones, are worth proceeding with.  And there is social  interaction, where a
failure to offer one's own priorities as things to negotiate about is disastrous.
There is long-term planning, where one must anticipate what one will aim at
in the future and make accommodation for it even when it differs from what
one wants now, given that future aims are worth making room for because
they are one's own future projects. In all of these, and others, self-respect is
an essential resource and damaged self-respect is crippling.
You can have too much pride, both for moral and for practical reasons. And
conversely you can have too much humility; some degree of humility is good.
But you cannot have too little humiliation; no degree of humiliation is good.
And you cannot have too much self-respect. The more you have, the better
you will function to achieve your ends, and the better you will treat everyone
else.
Adam Morton
University of British Columbia
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